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THE NONPROBATE REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE
OF THE LAW OF SUCCESSION
John H. Langbein*
The popular demand for probate avoidance has coincided with a funda-
mental change in the nature of wealth. Mogt property now takes the form
of claims on financial intermediaries, who can easily transfer account bal-
ances on death, without court proceedings. Further, creditors have devel-
oped a variety of techniques for collecting decedents' debts without probate.
Professor Langbein sees in these developments the basis for legitimating the
main will substitutes as "nonprobate wills" and for unifying the construc-
tional law of wills and will substitutes.
O VER the course of the twentieth century, persistent tides of
change have been lapping at the once-quiet shores of the law of
succession. Probate, our court-operated system for transferring wealth
at death, is declining in impprtance. Institutions that administer non-
court modes of transfer are displacing the probate system. Life in-
surance companies, pension plan operators, commercial banks, sav-
ings banks, investment companies, brokerage houses, stock transfer
agents, and a variety of other financial intermediaries are functioning
as free-market competitors of the probate system and enabling prop-
erty to pass on death without probate and without will. The law of
wills and the rules of descent no longer govern succession to most of
the property of most decedents. Increasingly, probate bears to the
actual practice of succession about the relation that bankruptcy bears
to enterprise: it is an indispensable institution, but hardly one that
everybody need use.
This Article seeks to explain some of the causes and consequences
of the nonprobate revolution. Part I describes the major will substi-
tutes, the instruments of the nonprobate system. Part II identifies a
pair of central causes of the decline of probate. 1 First, changes in the
nature of wealth and in patterns of wealth-holding, especially changes
associated with the rise of financial intermediation, have radically
diminished the need for title-clearing. Meanwhile, the business prac-
tices of lenders have been developing. in ways that have stripped the
real importance from the creditor protection function of probate.
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Carrico, Charles Donahue, Jr., Richard Epstein, Lawrence Friedman, Mary Ann Glendon,
Richard Helmholz, Ian Macneil, Lawrence Waggoner, Richard Wellman, and James Zartman.
1 The term "probate" originally applied only to the proceedings used to prove (probare) a
will; it stood in contrast to "administration," which comprehended all subsequent proceedings
winding up the estate. In modem American usage, "probate" embraces "administration" and
hence extends to the administration of both testate and intestate estates. See, e.g., M. RHEIN-
STEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAv OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 478 (,971).
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These are the underlying forces that have unleashed the will substi-
tutes and made possible the dominance of the nonprobate system.
Part III treats a long-festering problem of legal doctrine: the need
to reconcile nonprobate transfers with the supposed monopoly of pro-
bate. In order to validate will-like modes of transfer that lack Wills
Act formality and that operate without the mechanisms and protec-
tions of probate, we have been pretending that the will substitutes
are lifetime transfers. In truth, will substitutes are simply "nonprobate
wills" - "wills" that need not comply with the Wills Act.
Our preoccupation with denying the will-like character of the will
substitutes has distorted legal doctrine on a range of issues. Construc-
tional questions that are functionally identical are now handled under
different rubrics, and outcomes differ depending on whether a transfer
occurred in a probate or a nonprobate mode. Part IV shows how the
recognition of the will-like character of will substitutes can provide a
basis for consistent treatment of these construction issues. In place of
pointless skirmishing about how to draw the probate/nonprobate line,
we can have a unified law of succession.
I. THE WILL SUBSTITUTES
Four main will substitutes constitute the core of the nonprobate
system: life insurance, pension accounts, joint accounts, and revocable
trusts. When properly created, each is functionally indistinguishable
from a will - each reserves to the owner complete lifetime dominion,
including the power to name and to change beneficiaries until death.
These devices I shall call "pure" will substitutes, in contradistinction
to "imperfect" will substitutes (primarily joint tenancies), which more
closely resemble completed lifetime transfers. The four pure will sub-
stitutes may also be described as mass will substitutes: they are mar-
keted by financial intermediaries using standard form instruments with
fil-in-the-blank beneficiary designations.
The typical American of middle- or upper-middle-class means em-
ploys many will substitutes. The precise mix of will and will substi-
tutes varies with individual circumstances - age, family, employ-
ment, wealth, and legal sophistication. 2 It would not be unusual for
someone in mid-life to have a dozen or more will substitutes in force,
whether or not he had a will.
3
2 The number of will substitutes that a person has in force probably declines as he reaches
old age. Many life insurance policies expire when an insured leaves employment or attains a
certain age. An elderly insured may allow other insurance to lapse because the cost of protection
rises steeply while the need to protect dependents ordinarily diminishes. Pension accounts tend
to be annuitized or consumed in retirement. Joint accounts are predominantly spousal will
substitutes, and the survivor who takes under such arrangements is less likely to create them
afresh in widowhood for nonspousal survivors.




A propertied person of middle years commonly has several life
insurance policies that he has acquired at different times - one or
two purchased individually, others obtained as group policies that
typically arise out of employment. 4 The beneficiary designation in a
life insurance policy serves precisely the function of the designation
of a devisee in a will. The label aside, life insurance is functionally
indistinguishable from a will, for it satisfies the twin elements of the
definition of a will. We say that a will is revocable until the death
of the testator and that the interests of the devisees are ambulatory
- that is, nonexistent until the testator's death.5 Unless specially
restricted by contract, the life insurance beneficiary designation op-
erates identically.
In the I96O's, Spencer Kimball wrote about "the close similarity"
of the execution of a life insurance beneficiary designation "to the
making of a will. . . . Just as the will is 'ambulatory,' taking effect
only on death, so the beneficiary designation can be changed until
death."' 6 Indeed, Kimball said, life insurance was displacing testation:
The only significant assets of the estates of most people are the
proceeds of one or more life insurance policies. For such people,
constituting a majority of the population, determination of the distri-
bution of that "prqperty" through the designation of a beneficiary
under the insurance contract not only has precisely the same function
as a will; but constitutes a much more important "testament" than
Michael Carrico of the Indiana University School of Law produced some suggestive data
regarding these patterns. The respondents (242 in number) were asked whether they had in
effect any of five common will substitutes: life insurance, trusts, pensions, joint savings accounts,
or P.O.D. ("pay-on-death') bonds. The interviewers recorded the number of types of will
substitutes in effect for each respondent, but not the number of instances of each type, because
it was discovered "in pretesting [that] many respondents had no idea about how many were in
effect and . . . that almost all respondents had great trouble with those questions." Letter from
Professor Michael Carrico to the author (Jan. 18, 1984). The results were as follows: Ii.2% of
the respondents reported having none of the five types in effect, 15.7% had one in effect, 38.4%
had two, 27.3% had three, and 7.4% had four. Persons with none or only one were dispro-
portionately of the lowest income category (below $io,ooo per year) and the lowest age group
(20 to 29 years old). Id. For a more complete discussion of the survey from which this data
derives, see Carrico, Public Knowledge and Attitudes About Property Distributions at Death
and Will Substitutes in Indiana, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. (forthcoming).
4 See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1983, at 20 (1983)
("Some 154 million people were insured by some form of life insurance at year-end 1982.").
S On the definition of a will, see the main American text, T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF WILLS 1-3 (2d ed. 1953), which follows Jarman, the I9th century English writer, see
I T. JARMAN, JARMAN ON WILLS 26 (R. Jennings 8th ed. 1951).
6 Kimball, The Functions of Designations of Beneficiaries in Modem Life Insurance: U.S.A.,




the will. In view of the numbers of people involved, the life insurance
beneficiary designation is the principal "last will and testament" of
our legal system.
7
At the end of 1982, the face amount of life insurance in force in
the United States approached four and one-half trillion dollars and
averaged over $57,000 per insured family; payments on death during
the year exceeded fifteen billion dollars. 8
B. Pension Accounts
Any American who has spent much time in the work force since
World War II is likely to have acquired rights in one or more pension
accounts, depending upon his employment history and the features of
the plans in force where he has worked. 9 The tax laws have also
been encouraging him to create supplementary retirement accounts,
sometimes arranged through his employer, otherwise in the form of
IRA accounts or Keogh plans with any of the many financial inter-
mediaries that offer them.' 0 All these pension accounts contain will
substitutes - beneficiary designations that pass the owner's interest
to the persons of his choice in the event that he dies before exhausting
the account in its retirement payout phase." In 1983 the pension
industry journal reckoned that "[t]he assets of the nation's non-federal
pension plans probably now exceed $i trillion."' 2
C. Bank, Brokerage, and Mutual Fund Accounts
In arranging their personal banking, Americans meet another raft
of invitations to execute will substitutes. Married persons in particular
elect these options widely. The purest of the bank-operated will sub-
stitutes are accounts over which the depositor retains explicit lifetime
dominion while designating beneficiaries to take on his death. Where
7 Id. at 76. If Kimball had written this passage in the i98o's rather than the ig6O's, he
would have qualified it to reflect the greater prominence of pension assets.
8 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 4, at 5, 37-38.
9 See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV., REFORMING RETIREMENT POLICIES 18 (1981)
("[T]he proportion of full-time workers in the private nonagricultural sector between 25 and 64
years of age participating in employer pension plans has risen from less than 5o percent in z957
to more than 75 percent in 1979.").
10 See I PENS. & PROFIT SHARING (P-H) 12,001-13,587 (1982-1983).
11 When a plan participant dies before satisfying vesting requirements in a defined-benefit
plan, survivorship rights ordinarily perish with retirement rights. Moreover, not all pension
plans have survivorship rights. Some government-operated plans feature limited survivorship
rights that restrict the participant's choice of beneficiary to certain dependents or (like Social
Security) deny him any choice. See Dunham, Sixty Different Succession Laws in Illinois, 46
ILL. B.J. 741 (1958).
12 Pensions & Investment Age, Apr. 18, 1983, at io. The same journal computed in the
wake of the 1982-1983 stock market rise that the asset values of the nation's i,ooo largest
pension funds had reached $8o6 billion at year-end 2983. See id., Jan. 23, 2984, at 3.
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local law permits, such arrangements may assume the blatant form
of the P.O.D. ("pay on death") account, which was pioneered by the
United States Treasury for selling government bonds. 13 Elsewhere,
the subterfuge of the Totten trust, discussed below, 14 allows a func-
tionally identical result.
More commonly, the joint bank account - whether savings or
checking - is manipulated to do the work of a will.15 In theory,
joint accounts differ from other pure will substitutes: they look more
like gifts than like wills. When the owner of property arranges to
take title jointly, he supposedly creates a present interest in his donee-
cotenant. In the prototypical joint tenancy of realty, the donee re-
ceives an interest equal to the donor's, and the donor loses the power
to revoke the transfer. Moreover, the commonality-of-use rule requires
that the cotenants act together in order to transfer the realty. 16 Joint
accounts of personalty, however, "differ from the true joint tenancies
as defined in [real] property law, for by the privilege of withdrawal
either [cotenant] may consume the account."' 1 Accordingly, a depos-
itor may name a cotenant on a bank account but deal with the account
as though it were his own. The cotenant may not even know that he
has been designated. Depending on his contract with the bank, the
depositor may revoke and alter cotenancy designations as freely as he
would beneficiary designations under any of the other will substitutes.
He may also achieve the same result by closing the account, with-
drawing the funds, and opening another account as he pleases. In
this way, joint accounts may be used to approximate the incidents of
a will; the cotenancy designation is effectively revocable and ambu-
latory.
Brokerage houses apply the same mechanism to so-called street
accounts. '8 In an account that is nominally joint, the beneficial owner
13 See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.2D 1221 (1954) (discussing the rights upon death of
surviving co-owners of United States bonds).
14 See infra p. 113.
Is See infra note 23 (discussing prevalence of joint ownership). Joint accounts serve more
than one purpose. Doubtless the main attraction for spouses is that joint accounts achieve what
is in practice an agency or cross-agency arrangement empowering each spouse to draw on the
other's funds in the account. Joint accounts have also been employed to avoid guardianship in
the event of incapacity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d i8o, 183, 227 N.E.2d
445, 447 (1955) (holding inference of donative intent rebutted by proof that depositor told
cotenant, "I want your name on these bank accounts so that in case I am sick you can go and
get the money for me."). It is to be hoped that the spread of modern durable-powers schemes
such as UNIF. PROBATE CODE (UPC) §§ 5-5o to -502 (1982) will abate the use of joint accounts
as guardianship substitutes.
16 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
17 R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 65, at 217 (2d ed. 1955) (footnote
omitted).
18 An example, the Merrill Lynch account form, is reprinted in Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 489, 5o5 n.67 (i975). Securities held in
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of the securities may deal with them as though he has not made the
cotenancy designation, but on the owner's death the cotenant succeeds
to the securities or other account proceeds. Investment companies
have extended the practice to mutual fund accounts, including the
hugely successful money market funds of the 197o's and i98O's.
D. The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust
Although the revocable trust is the fundamental device that the
estate-planning bar employs to fit the carriage trade with highly in-
dividuated instruments, the revocable trust also keeps company with
the mass will substitutes. Standard-form revocable trusts with fill-in-
the-blank beneficiary designations are widely offered in the banking
industry and were at one time aggressively promoted in the mutual
fund industry. 19 The Totten trust, an especially common variant, is
simply a deposit account in which the beneficiary designation is thinly
camouflaged under language of trust. 20 The depositor names himself
trustee for the beneficiary, but retains lifetime dominion and the power
to revoke. The Totten trust, revealingly called the "tentative" trust
in the Restatement of Trusts,21 has often been referred to as "the poor
man's will" (although, as Lawrence Friedman has remarked, the term
'middle-class will" would be more accurate22).
Either by declaration of trust or by transfer to a third-party trustee,
the appropriate trust terms can replicate the incidents of a will. The
owner who retains both the equitable life interest and the power to
alter and revoke the beneficiary designation has used the trust form
to achieve the effect of testation. Only nomenclature distinguishes the
reniainder interest created by such a trust from the mere expectancy
arising under a will. Under either the trust or the will, the interest
of the beneficiaries is both revocable and ambulatory.
"street name" are registered in the name of the broker (or other intermediary), rather than in
the name of the beneficial owner for whose account they are held.
19 The Farkas case dealt with a declaration-of-trust form peddled by a mutual fund sponsor.
See Farkas v. Williams, 5 li. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 6oo (I955), discussed at infra pp. 1i26-27.
Norman Dacey, who popularized the revocable trust as a device for probate avoidance, see
infra p. 1116, was a mutual fund salesman. See Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129,
222 A.2d 339 (t966).
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
21 Id. The Uniform Probate Code, which validates P.O.D. accounts, effectively assimilates
the Totten trust to the P.O.D. account by spelling out that the trust account "belongs beneficially
to the trustee during his lifetime" and to the beneficiary on the trustee's death. UPC §§ 6-
I03(c), -104(C)(2) (1982): The Totten trust is named-after the leading case, In re Totten, 179
N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904), in which the label "tentative trust" also appears, id. at 126, 71
N.E. at 752.
22 Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and Society,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 340, 369.
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E. Imperfect Will Substitutes
The "pure" will substitutes are not the only instruments of the
nonprobate revolution; "imperfect" will substitutes - most prominent
among them the common-law joint tenancy - also serve to transfer
property at death without probate. Joint tenancies in real estate and
in securities are quite common; joint tenancies in automobiles and
other vehicles are also fairly widespread.2 3 Because they ordinarily
effect lifetime transfers, joint tenancies are "imperfect" rather than
"pure" will substitutes. When the owner of a house, a car, a boat,
or a block of IBM common stock arranges to take title jointly, his
cotenant acquires an interest that is no longer revocable and ambu-
latory. Under the governing recording act or stock transfer act, both
cotenants must ordinarily join in any subsequent transfer.24 Yet like
the pure will substitutes, joint tenancy arrangements allow the sur-
vivor to obtain marketable title without probate: under joint tenancy,
a death certificate rather than a probate decree suffices to transfer
title.2 5
People seeking to transfer property at death without using the
probate system have thus been tempted to use the common-law joint
tenancy as a will substitute notwithstanding its lifetime consequences.
This practice has bred a considerable case law treating situations in
which the transferor changes his mind and seeks to rescind the trans-
fer. The trend of modern authority is to allow him to unscramble the
transaction by proving that he lacked donative intent.2 6 Blanchette
v. Blanchette,27 a Massachusetts case decided in 1972, is instructive.
Robert Blanchette bought AT&T stock under an employee stock-
purchase plan. He took title to several certificates jointly with his
wife Marie in order that, should he predecease her, she would have
the stock "without probate or lawyer."' 28 The marriage later soured
and ended in divorce. Robert sued to have himself declared the sole
owner of the shares and to obtain a decree ordering Marie to release
23 Empirical studies of joint tenancies, conducted in Iowa in the i96o's by William Hines,
supply some suggestive data. Hines found "that in 1964 an average of 52 per cent of all Iowa
land transfers created joint tenancies." Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and
Fancy, 51 IowA L. REV. 582, 587 (1966) (footnote omitted). In a small sample of Iowa
households, Hines found astonishing levels of joint tenancy in personalty: about 89% of checking
accounts, 8i% of savings accounts and time certificates, 55% of stock, 72% of bonds, 39% of
first cars, and 20% of second cars were jointly held. See Hines, Personal Property Joint
Tenancies: More Law, Fact, and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REv. 509, 574 (1970).
24 See I F. CHRISTY & R. APPEL, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK § 220, at 15:6-.7 (5th ed.
1975) (stock transfer). Regarding realty, see supra p. 1112. The recording act for boats is
federal. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 921-927 (1976).
2S See, e.g., I F. CHRISTY & R. APPEL, supra note 24, § 220, at 15:7.
26 See, e.g., Blanciette v. Blanchette, 362 Mass. 518, 521, 287 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1972)
(collecting cases).
27 362 Mass. 58, 287 N.E.2d 459 (1972).
28 Id. at 520, 287 N.E.2d at 461.
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her interest. The Supreme Judicial Court held for Robert on the basis
of the trial court's finding that Robert had not created the joint
tenancy with donative intent, but solely as a will substitute.
29
The joint tenancy, although an imperfect will substitute, works
well enough in more tranquil family circumstances in which the trans-
feror is not reluctant to part with exclusive lifetime dominion. By
providing a nonprobate mode of transfer for realty and securities, the
joint tenancy operates in conjunction with the pure will substitutes to
make total avoidance of probate feasible for persons of ordinary or
even substantial means.
If we were concerned to complete a taxonomy of will substitutes,
we could lengthen our list to include devices that are scorned by both
lawyers and financial intermediaries but that still attract laymen. A
substantial case law chronicles laymen's quixotic attempts to achieve
will-like results by manipulating the contingent estates and delivery
rules of the law of deeds. 30 The gift causa mortis is a transparent
will substitute, but it can be messy to prove, and it is difficult to keep
in force because of the rule that it self-destructs on the donor's return
to health. 31 These and other stray dogs of the American law of
gratuitous transfers populate the law school casebooks but have not
been quantitatively important in the nonprobate revolution.
1-. THE HIDDEN CAUSES OF THE NONPROBATE REVOLUTION
The typical propertied decedent in modern America leaves a will
and many will substitutes. The will substitutes differ from the ordi-
nary "last will and testament" in three main ways. First, most will
substitutes - but not all - are asset-specific: each deals with a single
type of property, be it life insurance proceedsi a bank balance, mutual
fund shares, or whatever. 32 Second, property that passes through a
will substitute avoids probate. A financial intermediary ordinarily
takes the place of the probate court in effecting the transfer. Third,
the formal requirements of the Wills Act 33 - attestation and so forth
- do not govern will substitutes and are not complied with. Of these
29 Such cases can be decided oppositely, of course, when the facts support a finding of
donative intent. See, e.g., Clay v. Keiser, 46o Pa. 620, 334 A.2d 263 (,975).
30 For a recent discussion with citations to earlier literature, see Browder, Giving or Leaving
- What Is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 845, 86o-64 (1977).
31 1 W. BoWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 7.34, at 338-39 (i96o).
32 Revocable inter vivos trusts need not be asset-specific; they can apply, as broadly as a
will, to any and all forms of property. The misnamed "cash management account," developed
by Merrill Lynch and now widely available in the brokerage industry in joint account form,
can also contain a variety of financial instruments.
33 See infra note 68.
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differences, only probate avoidance is a significant advantage that
transferors might consciously seek.
34
No one is surprised that somebody like Robert Blanchette would
want to arrange for his wife to succeed to his property "without
probate or lawyer."' 35 Since the mid-i96o's, when Norman Dacey's
How to Avoid Probate36 ascended the best-seller lists, there has been
no denying the depth of public dissatisfaction with probate.37 The
probate system has earned a lamentable reputation for expense, delay,
clumsiness, makework, and worse. In various jurisdictions, especially
the dozen-odd that have adopted or imitated the simplified procedures
of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969 ("UPC"), the intensity of hostility
to probate may have abated a little. There are, however, intrinsic
limits to the potential of probate reform. As Richard Welman, the
principal draftsman of the UPC, forthrightly declared: "The assump-
tion that administration of an estate requires a judicial proceeding is
as doubtful as it is costly." 38 Because the Anglo-American procedural
tradition is preoccupied with adversarial and litigational values, 39 the
decision to organize any function as a judicial proceeding is inconsis-
tent with the interests that ordinary people regard as paramount when
they think about the transmission of their property at death: dispatch,
simplicity, inexpensiveness, privacy. As long as probate reform still
34 The asset-specific quality of the mass will substitutes is a background factor that helps
explain the convenience and dispatch of nonprobate transfer. Avoidance of Wills Act formality
is incidental to probate avoidance and is not likely to be an important independent desideratum,
although some people who are uneasy about dealing with lawyers and legal formality may be
more comfortable in the attestation-free, fill-in-the-blank world of the mass will substitutes,
which are closer to routine financial transactions.
3S See Blanchette, 362 Mass. at 520, 287 N.E.2d at 461.
36 N. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE (1965). Dacey recently published a revision, N.
DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE - NEWLY UPDATED! (i980). For a withering critique in an
ABA section journal, see Zartman, How to Void Dacey - 198o, 17 LAW NOTES FOR GEN.
PRAC. 73 (1981).
37 See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 456-57 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing public reaction); Wellman, The Uniformn Probate
Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191, 192 (1969) (discussing notoriety
of Dacey's 1965 publication as well as response of bar and commentators).
38 Wellman, supra note 37, at 193.
39 Some wonderful if atypical examples from Georgia law are collected in Bostick, The
Revocable Trust: A Means of Avoiding Probate in the Small Estate?, 21 U: FLA. L. REV. 44
(i968):
[P]robate .procedures originally designed to assure fair and honest estate settlement
. . . today must be regarded as cautious to the point of absurdity. Typical of these
procedures is the rule requiring personal service of certain kinds of notice on infant heirs
of an estate. In this situation, the serving office[r] or attorney under a strict construction
may find himself in the position of actually placing a copy of the legal document in the
crib of a small child out of fear that the service may otherwise be inadequate to satisfy
the statute. . . . Equally absurd is'the statute requiring the attorney or some other
representative of the estate to read the contents of a legal advertisement giving notice of
intention to sell estate assets from the courthouse steps - often to nonexistent listeners.
Id. at 48 (footnotes omitted).
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calls for probate, 40 it will not go far enough for the tastes of many
transferors, who view probate as little more than a tax imposed for
the benefit of court functionaries and lawyers.
The puzzle in the story of the nonprobate revolution is not that
transferors should have sought to avoid probate, but rather that other
persons whose interests probate was meant to serve - above all,
creditors - should have allowed the protections of the probate system
to slip away from them. Probate performs three essential functions:
(i) making property owned at death marketable again (title-clearing);
(2) paying off the decedent's debts (creditor protecti6n); and (3) imple-
menting the decedent's donative intent respecting the property that
remains once the claims of creditors have been discharged (distribu-
tion).4 ' It is in the sphere of distribution or gratuitous transfer that
the will substitutes have proved themselves to be such formidable
competitors of the probate system. Although the will substitutes are
not well suited to clearing title and protecting creditors, a series of
changes in the nature of wealth and in the business practices of
creditors has diminished the importance of these functions.
A. Title-Clearing
The probate court is empowered to transfer title to a decedent's
real property and thereby to restore it to marketability under the
recording system. The cautious procedures of probate administration
have seemed especially appropriate for realty, because the values tend
to be large and the financing complex. In theory, the probate court
should exercise a similar title-clearing function for all personalty, down
to the sugar bowl and the pajamas, because only a court decree can
perfect a successor's title in any item of personalty. Of course, ordi-
nary practice quite belies the theory. Beyond the realm of vehicles
and registered securities, which are covered by recording systems and
thus resemble realty in some of the mechanics of transfer, formal
evidence of title is not required to render personalty usable and mar-
ketable.
If a decedent's survivors can agree among themselves on a division
of his personalty, they can distribute it without court decree. An
40 The UPC was amended in 1982 to authorize a version.of the universal successor system
of Continental law. See UPC §§ 3-312 to -322 (1982) (succession without administration). It
remains to be seen whether American jurisdictions, including states where the pre-1982 UPC is
in force, will enact a scheme that finally eliminates mandatory probate.
41 This way of categorizing the functions of probate, while quite conventional, see, e.g., M.
RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note i, at 477, is not compelled. Another way to conceive
of probate is to say that it functions (i) to identify the decedents rightful successors, and (2) to
extinguish competing claims through a variety-of means including the discharge of legitimate
debts and taxes, the operation of the nonclaim statutes, see infra note 67, and the adjudication
and rejection of unfounded claims. In this way of looking at the process, title-clearing is less
an object than an intrinsic byproduct of probate.
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empirical study conducted by Allison Dunham in Cook County (Chi-
cago), Illinois, in the 1950's found that about fifteen percent of deaths
resulted in probate administration. 42 Why did the remaining eighty-
five percent not require probate? Infants apart, few people are so
pauperized that they die owning absolutely nothing. 43 The reason
most deaths do not lead to probate is not that the decedents are
propertyless, but simply that they do not own real property (at least
not in single tenancy). The survivors can therefore divide up the
personalty in a fashion that satisfies those who are entitled to institute
probate either under a will or under intestacy.44 The legislatures of
many states have encouraged this species of probate avoidance
through such means as statutes that enable survivors to obtain title
to decedents' motor vehicles without probate.
45
Even real property may pass through nonprobate channels in cer-
tain circumstances. When realty is held in joint tenancy, as residential
property so often is, 46 a death certificate alone clears title for the
survivor.47 Furthermore, there are modes of equitable conveyancing
that leave the underlying legal title to the property unaltered and
allow a trustee or some similar entity to effect the transfer without
probate. Moreover, real estate devoted to entrepreneurial and com-
mercial purposes is increasingly held in corporate form; so, too, is
agricultural land, in consequence of the movement to consolidate
farms in larger, more capital-intensive units whose financing needs
42 See Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30
U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 244 (1963). A study done in the i96o's of testate estates in largely
suburban Washtenaw,County (Ann Arbor), Michigan, indicates a comparable level of probates.
See Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH.
L. REv. r303, 1304 (1969). Browder reported 223 testate estates commenced in the year z963.
His study did not require him to compare this figure to the number of deaths for the year,
According to data supplied by the Office of the County Clerk, Washtenaw County, there were
2448 deaths in that year; thus, testate estates constituted 9.I% of the death cohort. Dunham's
figure for testate estates in Cook County for I957 was 8.3% of the death cohort. See Dunham,
supra, at 244. (I wish to acknowledge the kindness of Margaret Thompson and Lawrence
Waggoner in obtaining the unpublished Washtenaw County figure for me.)
43 Most estates are, of course, quite small. Under the federal estate tax law in effect until
1976, which made estates taxable above a $6o,ooo exemption, "only 7% of decedents each year
paid an estate tax." McDaniel, Foreword: The Interaction of Tax Planning and Tax Policy, 19
B.C.L. REV. 387, 399 (1978). ,
44 I spoke of this phenomenon in Langbein, supra note 18, at 5og n.85.
45 Statutes commonly authorize state motor vehicle registrars to transfer title to decedents'
automobiles without probate decree, merely on affidavit of next-of-kin that the record owner is
deceased and that the estate is not being probated. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 5910 (West
197); see also 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 114(b) (Purdon 1977) (authorizing transfer of
certificate of title to surviving spouse or spouse's designee on affidavit of surviving spouse that
all decedent's debts have been paid).
46 See supra note 13.
47 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 565.48 (I979).
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often dictate the corporate form.48 Thus, even the family farm, the
prototypical object of the probate system, may be transferred outside
of the recording system, through the medium of corporation shares.
Nevertheless, real property continues to be the main preserve of
probate. Ownership of realty is the factor most likely to determine
whether a death will lead to a probate proceeding. Data gathered in
the 197o's by Robert Stein for an American Bar Foundation study
reveals high concentrations of real property in probate estates. About
thirty percent of the Maryland probate estates in Stein's sample, over
fifty percent of the California estates, and more than eighty percent
of the Texas estates contained realty requiring probate.
49
The preoccupation of probate procedure with the transfer of title
to single-tenancy real estate reflects the wealth patterns of the small-
farm, small-enterprise economy of the nineteenth century that shaped
our probate tradition. "Today's most worrisome and potentially lethal
shortcoming of probate," wrote C. Dent Bostick in 1968, "is its in-
creasing irrelevance to modern modes of wealth. ''" ° Recall Roscoe
Pound's ringing aphorism: "Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up
largely of promises." 5' The bulk of modern wealth takes the form of
contract rights rather than rights in rem - promises rather than
things. The recent boom in residential real estate and collectibles
should not obscure this point. Promissory instruments - stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, bank deposits, and pension and insurance rights
- are the dominant component of today's private wealth. Together
with public promises (that is, government transfer payments) these
instruments of financial intermediation eclipse realty and tangible per-
sonalty.
The instruments of financial intermediation depend upon an un-
derlying administrative capacity that is without counterpart in the
realm of realty and tangible personalty. Financial intermediation is,
as the term signifies, intrinsically administrative. Administrators in-
termediate between savers and borrowers, between passive owners
and active users of capital. Pooling wealth and servicing the resulting
liabilities involves recurrent transactions and communications. Once
a bureaucracy appropriate to such tasks is in operation, only a scant
adaptation is necessary to extend its functions and procedures to
include the transfer of account balances on death.
48 The subchapter S taxation scheme eliminates for many family enterprises the tax disad-
vantage that would otherwise have impeded the use of the corporate form. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-
1379 (1982).
49 Letter from Dean Robert Stein, University of Minnesota Law School, to the author (July
20, 1982) (supplying data).
50 Bostick, supra note 39, at 46. Bostick continues: "An abundant concern with real estate
title anal its protection is reflected in much of modem probate laws ... ." Id.
$1 R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
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The probate system nonetheless backstops the practice of financial
intermediaries in important ways. The standard form instruments of
the nonprobate system all but invariably name the transferor's probate
estate as the ultimate contingent beneficiary. If, therefore, the named
beneficiaries predecease the transferor or cannot be identified, the
financial intermediary remits the fund to probate distribution. Messy
heirship determinations are foisted off onto the courts. Likewise, if
the proper course of distribution is for some reason doubtful, or if
contest threatens, financial intermediaries can force the probate (or
other) courts to decide the matter. For example, the intermediary can
interplead, or simply refuse suspect claims and force the claimants to
sue.5 2 In this way the nonprobate system rides "piggyback" on the
probate system. Financial intermediaries execute easy transfers and
shunt the hard ones over to probate. But because virtually all trans-
fers are easy, this attribute of the nonprobate system is a major source
of its efficiency and comparative advantage. In the nonprobate sys-
tem, genuine disputes still reach the courts, but routine administration
does not.
B. Creditor Protection
The other set of changes that underlie the nonprobate revolution
concerns another great mission of probate: discharging the decedent's
debts. Many of the details of American probate procedure, as well
as much of its larger structure, would not exist but for the need to
identify and pay off creditors. These procedures are indispensable,
but - and here I am asserting a proposition that- has not been
adequately understood - only for the most exceptional cases. In
general, creditors do not need or use probate.
I have undertaken to verify this point within the retail and con-
sumer credit industry 5 3 Without mounting a systematic empirical
study, I have tried to inquire broadly among credit officers and credit
information specialists and their lawyers. Among those I interviewed,
I found unanimity both on the central proposition that probate plays
an inconsequential role in the collection of decedents' debts, and on
the reasons why.
S2 See, e.g., Lovell v. Marianna Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 264 Ark. 99, 568 S.W.2d 38 (1978)
(interpleader); McGee v. St. Francois County Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 559 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1977)
(suit following bank's refusal to pay).
53 I wish to express my gratitude to the credit-industry and legal professionals who took
time to answer my questions, including James Alston, American Express Company; James
Matthews, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company; A. Charlene Sullivan, Credit
Research Center, Purdue University; James Jurgens and Anne Spioto, First National Bank of
Chicago; John Carland, Marshall Field and Company; Lydia Cummings, Hugh Korosec, and
Glen Taylor, Montgorery Ward; Stephen Kernkraut, Nancy McCormick, and Gil Wiemers,




In the vast majority of cases, survivors pay off decedents' debts
voluntarily and rapidly. The chief credit officer of the Marshall Field's
department store chain mentioned a particularly telling illustration of
this phenomenon. He said that a goodly number of Field's customers
were among the 300 victims who died in the DC-io airliner crash in
Chicago in the spring of 1979. Within a fortnight of the disaster, the
firm began receiving letters from widows, mothers, and other survi-
vors of crash victims, who reported the deaths and either enclosed
checks or asked guidance in settling accounts.5 4 Such a mass catas-
trophe makes the pattern of voluntary assumption and discharge of
decedents' debts dramatically visible, but the phenomenon is equally
prevalent regardless of the circumstances of death.
Creditors know that survivors behave in this way, and they rely
upon voluntary notice from survivors as their primary means of learn-
ing about a debtor's death. A credit officer with Montgomery Ward
("Ward's"), the national retail chain, estimated that his firm learned
of debtors' deaths from survivors' reports perhaps ninety-five percent
of the time.55 In the remainder of cases, which usually involve un-
married decedents, the creditor commonly discovers the death when
the account becomes delinquent and collections personnel begin mak-
ing inquiries. None of the large retail creditors with whom I spoke
made any effort to take advantage of the formal notice-of-death pro-
cedures contained in the probate codes for their protection, nor did
they have anyone assigned to read newspaper obituaries or inspect
official death registers.
I found the belief widespread among credit industry professionals
that voluntary payment is motivated largely by moral as opposed to
legal considerations: survivors want to discharge the just debts of
decedents, for honor's sake. But many factors bear on this phenom-
enon, and observers who, unlike me, doubt that ordinary human
decency inspires people to act against their economic self-interest can
find some comfort in the evidence. Because the account balances in
question are often small, honor is relatively inexpensive. For example,
at Ward's in June 1983 the average balance outstanding on active
accounts was $47o; at the J.C. Penney chain the figure was a little
over $300.56 But these amounts are averages, and millions of accounts
run much smaller balances. Indeed, decedents are disproportionately
elderly, and the elderly tend to have lower consumption patterns and
credit needs than do young families. Although the elderly are major
consumers of health care services, decedents' medical debts are largely
discharged by third-party payment through the public and private
S4 Telephone interview with John Carland, Marshall Field and Company (Nov. 26, 1979).
SS Telephone interview with Glen Taylor, Montgomery Ward (June 22, 1983).
56 Telephone interview with Nancy McCormick, J.C. Penney (July 8, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as McCormick interview]; Telephone interview, supra note 55-
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health-insurance systems; and in any event there is unlikely to be a
notice problem when a patient dies in his creditor's hands.
When survivors do not pay bank-charge or retail-credit accounts
promptly, credit professionals contact them. Appeals to moral in-
stincts are common ("Is it worth soiling your father's reputation in
order to deadbeat us out of $60?") and are widely thought to be
effective. In many cases there is also an overlay of legal obligation
or economic advantage in a survivor's relationship to an account.
Especially among spouses, accounts are often joint; the survivor will
have cosigned the account application and accepted joint liability.
The threat of credit reporting in such circumstances may have a
deterrent effect ("If you deadbeat us for $6o, you won't be able to get
credit from anybody else"). Some account contracts purport to create
security interests in all the goods giving rise to the debt, and the threat
of repossession can be a source of pressure for payment without court
proceedings. Sometimes a survivor has an auxiliary card on a dece-
dent's single-name account, and the decision to pay off the account
may be motivated by a desire to retain or convert the account.57
Many a widow continues her deceased husband's accounts, and only
much later, if ever, do the retailers learn of the death.
Creditor protection is also intertwined with a variant of the prin-
cipal will. substitute, life insurance. So-called credit life insurance
typically discharges an insured's account balance at death. There are
considerable differences in the extent to which various creditors en-
courage debtors to carry such insurance. At the Continental Bank, I
was told, about twenty percent of automobile loans generated by car
dealers carried credit life insurance. 58 Ward's, which operates its own
"captive" insurance company and promotes credit insurance through
sales literature and other means, has about a third of its active ac-
counts covered.5 9 By contrast, J.C. Penney does not offer credit life
insurance; and the First National Bank of Chicago, a major operator
of bank revolving-credit charge cards (Visa, Mastercard), has experi-
enced negligible enrollment in a credit insurance plan that has not
been much promoted. 60 The American Council of Life Insurance has
s7 This practice evokes an echo of one of Stewart Macaulay's findings about why businessmen
sometimes operate in disregard of the nominally applicable rules of contract:
Not only do the particular business units in a given exchange want to deal with each
other again, they also want to deal with other business units in the future. And the way
one behaves in a particular transaction, or a series of transactions, will color his general
business reputation.
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV: 55,
64 (1963).
58 Telephone interview with James Matthews, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company (June 29, 1983).
S9 Telephone interview, supra note 55.
60 Telephone interview with Gil Wiemers, J.C. Penney (July 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as




computed that by the end of 1982 more than sixty-six million credit
life policies were in force in the United States. More than $161 billion
in debts were insured; actual benefit payments during the year
amounted to $656 million. 61 Of course, credit insurance operates
entirely outside probate; most policies are written so that the insurer
pays the creditor directly.
Life insurance also figures indirectly in the phenomenon of vol-
untary discharge of decedents' debts. Most persons of youthful or
middle age who qualify for consumer credit are in the work force,
and group life insurance is a prevalent employee benefit; further, many
persons carry individual coverage. 62 Insurance proceeds enable sur-
vivors to pay the decedent's debts, and because this money derives
from the decedent, the moral compulsion to use some of it to clear
his debts may be keenly felt.
Toward the upper end of the scale of consumer debt, where we
encounter automobile finance, we find a different mode of creditor
protection, the security interest. A secured loan gives rise to a re-
corded lien and a right of the creditor to repossess for delinquency.63
This leverage over survivors ordinarily leads to out-of-court settlement
of such debts. The survivor assumes or pays off the debt or - less
frequently - surrenders the secured asset. Only in the relatively rare
case in which the value of the security is inadequate to cover the debt
might the creditor need recourse to probate to recover the deficiency.64
When this formidable battery of out-of-court payment and collec-
tion practices fails to clear a debt, the creditor protection system of
probate may also be unavailing. Although the safeguards of notice,
court filings, hearings, adjudication, and so forth are meant to protect
creditors, they are often self-defeating, because they make probate
proceedings too expensive to be cost effective for collecting routine
debts. Account balances are often so small that collection costs would
exceed the likely recovery even if nonlawyers handled most of the
filings and subsequent steps.
Nonetheless, creditors do use probate. The large creditors with
whom I spoke were prepared to go to probate to attempt to collect
debts of several thousand dollars when preliminary investigation by
credit information agencies or in-house personnel revealed the likeli-
hood of substantial assets in a probate estate. None seemed concerned
61 See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 4, at 32, 39. See generally I CONSUMER
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 580, 1120, 5IO5 (describing the main features of credit life insurance).
62 See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 4, at 28 (indicating that slightly more
than two trillion dollars of life insurance in force at year-end 1982 covered employees and
dependents under group life policies).
63 See U.C.C. §§ 9-50i to -507 (1977).
64 Likewise, in the realm of real estate finance, the mortgage lender relies all but entirely
upon his security interest to protect against default on death, which is why he is indifferent to
whether his borrower takes title in the probate-avoiding form of joint tenancy.
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to trace nonprobate assets. All thought that probate filings were of
declining cost effectiveness for account balances in the hundreds of
dollars, although (perhaps in part in order to maintain credibility in
negotiations) American Express and J.C. Penney engage in regular
probate filings for sums as low as $50 when out-of-court payment
cannot be arranged.
65
Thus, when survivors will not acknowledge or pay decedents'
debts without court coercion, when survivors cannot pay, or when a
decedent's estate is insolvent and apportionment of assets is necessary,
creditors still elect their probate remedies if outstanding debts are
large enough to justify the expense of the court proceedings. Fur-
thermore, creditors may benefit from the probate system without ac-
tually employing it. A creditor's access to the coercive powers of the
probate system has a deterrent influence that aids the creditor in his
attempts to obtain out-of-court satisfaction from survivors (and from
probate representatives - executors and administrators).
The creditor protection procedures of American probate law de-
veloped in the nineteenth century to serve needs radically different
from today's. By routinizing the process of calculatng and evidencing
consumer debts, the data processing revolution has virtually elimi-
nated the problem toward which much of the debt-resolving phase of
probate procedure has been oriented. Before the refinement and pop-
ularization of the corporate form of enterprise organization, personal
credit was far more entangled with entrepreneurs' business affairs.
Creditor protection mechanisms such as statutory security interests
and credit life insurance were primitive or unknown. Communica-
tions were slow and unreliable; learning about a death, identifying
survivors, and seeking voluntary payment could be difficult and time
consuming. Under such circumstances, the alternative of a court-run
system of centralized notice and payment channeling appeared more
sensible. There was less wealth - much less wealth - and that may
have affected the disposition and ability of survivors to pay off debts
gratuitously.
In the late twentieth century, creditor protection and probate have
largely parted company. Had this development been otherwise, the
rise of the will substitutes could not have occurred. If creditors had
continued to rely significantly upon probate for the payment of dece-
dents' debts, creditors' interests would have constituted an impossible
obstacle to the nonprobate revolution. For - make no mistake about
it - the will substitutes do impair the mechanism by which probate
protects creditors. Even though the substantive law governing most
of the major will substitutes usually recognizes the priority of creditors'
claims over the claims of gratuitous transferees (life insurance is some-
65 McCormick interview, supra note 56; Wiemers interview, supra note 6o; Telephone inter-
view with James Alston, American Express Company (July 7, 1983)..
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times an exception), 66 the decentralized procedures of the nonprobate
system materially disadvantage creditors. Whereas probate directs all
assets and all claimants to a common pot, the nonprobate system
disperses assets widely and facilitates transfer without creditors'
knowledge. 67 If modern creditors had needed to use probate very
much, they would have applied their considerable political muscle to
suppress the nonprobate system. Instead, they have acquiesced with-
out struggle, as have the most powerful of creditor-like agencies, the
federal and state revenue authorities.
III. THE JURIDICAL BASIS OF THE NONPROBATE SYSTEM
The nonprobate revolution has posed a conceptual problem for the
law of wills that is still not cleanly answered in the case law or in
the literature: How is it that will-like transfers escape being treated
like wills? In the law of wills, the least departure from Wills Act
formality68 routinely voids the transfer. Yet the will substitutes almost
never comply with the attestation requirements for attested wills, nor
do they satisfy the handwriting requirement for holographic wills.
69
What, then, sustains the will substitutes against the Wills Act?
66 On trusts, see 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 330.12, at 2614-16 (3d ed. i967); cf.
2 id. § r56, at 1190-97 (spendthrift trusts for settlor-beneficiary). On Totten trusts, see I id.
§ 58.5, at 543-44. On joint bank accounts, see UPC §§ 6-107 to -113 (1982). Creditors' rights
under state law are expressly preserved by id. § 6-2oi(b), discussed at infra pp. 1133-34. On
life insurance, see 2A J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1341-
1342, at 567-86 (1966).
67 The tendency toward ever-shorter periods for creditor filings in probate (nonclaim periods)
is a further symptom of the phenomenon discussed in text. Under the UPC, the nonclaim
period can be as short as four months. See UPC § 3-8o3 (1982). Compare the compilation of
American statutes, made a generation ago, of generally longer nonclaim periods. L. SIMES &
P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE 325-38 (1946)
(six- to twelve-month periods most common).
68 Every Anglo-American jurisdiction has a Wills Act that prescribes the formalities for
making an attested will. These statutes have a common core that traces back to English models
- the will provisions of the Statute of Frauds of 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, and the Wills Act of
2837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., ch. 26. The terms of the will must be in writing, the testator must
sign it, and two (sometimes three) witnesses must attest the testator's signature. Witnesses must
be "competent" in the sense of being disinterested. A variety of other requirements can be
found in the Wills Acts of different jurisdictions: rules governing the acknowledgment of a
signature already in place, rules calling for the testator and the witnesses to sign in each other's
presence, requirements about the positioning of signatures, and so forth. In the twenty-odd
American jurisdictions that permit holographic wills, the testator may substitute handwriting
for attestation. He may execute his will without witnesses if it is "entirely" (or in many states
"materially") in his handwriting. The holograph statutes in force as of i97I are collected and
categorized in M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note I, at 181-83. Adoptions of the
UPC, which contains a liberal holograph scheme, see UPC § 2-503 (2982) (promulgated in 2969),
have added a few more states to the list of those allowing holographs.
69 The will substitutes would not qualify as wills even if they were executed with formalities
satisfying the governing Wills Act, because they lack testamentary intent - that is, intent to
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Our law has dealt with this question by indulging in a pretense
by denying that the will substitutes are will-like and by validating
them as gifts. I shall urge a more candid answer, for which I think
there is much support in existing practice and doctrine.
A. The Present-Interest Test
The essential difference between a gift and a will can be simply
stated: a gift is a lifetime transfer, ordinarily effected by present
delivery of the property, whereas a will transfers property only on the
transferor's death. I explained in Part I why the pure will substitutes
fall so clearly on the will side of the gift/will line. Each maintains
the transferor's complete lifetime dominion and creates no interest in
the transferee until the transferor's death. Nevertheless, the case law
that has legitimated the pure will substitutes treats them as lifetime
transfers. The main stratagem has been to identify some so-called
"present interest" in the transferee, acquired during the lifetime of the
transferor, which makes the transferee a donee and distinguishes the
will substitute from a will.
The leading case exemplifying this mode of analysis is Farkas v.
Williams,"° decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1955. Farkas
signed four identical fill-in-the-blank declarations of trust supplied by
an investment company in connection with his purchase from the
company of four blocks of mutual fund shares. He filled in the name
of Williams, a faithful employee, as the beneficiary of each trust. The
standard form terms reserved to Farkas the right to revoke the trust,
to change beneficiaries, and to receive the trust income for life. 71 If
the beneficiary predeceased the testator, the trusts would be automat-
ically revoked. Sale (by redemption) of some or all of the shares
would operate as revocation pro tanto. 72 The declarations were not
attested and hence did not conform to the requirements of the local
Wills Act. 73
Farkas died intestate, and his heirs claimed the mutual fund shares
for the probate estate. The lower court held in their favor, reasoning
that because the beneficiary had had no enforceable interest during
Farkas' lifetime, the purported trusts were attempted wills that failed
for want of compliance with Wills Act formalities. 74 The supreme
court reversed, concluding that the trusts had created a present inter-
est in the beneficiary. The court conceded that "[i]t is difficult to name
use the probate system. On the requirement that there be testamentary intent independent of
formal compliance, see T. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 205-10.
70 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 6oo ('955).
71 See id. at 424, 125 N.E.2d at 604.
72 See id. at 423-24, 125 N.E.2d at 6o3-o4.
73 See id. at 421, 125 N.E.2d at 602.
74 Farkas v. Williams, 3 IM. App. 2d 248, 121 N.E.2d 344 (1954).
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this interest"75 but pointed approvingly to a label used in the first
Restatement of Trusts, the "contingent equitable interest in remain-
der."' 76 How was this remainder evidenced, since the terms of the
instrument permitted Farkas both full enjoyment during his lifetime
and complete freedom to dispose of the property on death, either by
changing trust beneficiaries or by revoking the trusts in whole or in
part? The only interest that, according to the court, passed inter
vivos to the beneficiary was one in a potential lawsuit: the right to
sue the trustee for a breach of some fiduciary duty that impaired the
bepeficiary's remainder interest. Acknowledging that the beneficiary
would never sue during the trustee's life because the trustee could
revoke and defeat the claim, the court maintained that the beneficiary
could wait for the trustee to die and then sue his estate for the breach
of fiduciary duty.
77
In truth, this ingeniously imagined interest would never be en-
forceable. In many cases, the estate of the transferor would have a
potent defense of laches: the beneficiary's delay in suing to recover for
the transferor's supposed breach induced the transferor to leave the
trust unrevoked. Even though laches might not defeat the claim of a
beneficiary who did not knowingly delay,78 success on the merits
would be improbable. It is hard to envision what acts of -misman-
agement might constitute a breach under a trust instrument that
expressly immunizes what is normally the most egregious breach a
trustee can commit - appropriation of the corpus for his own benefit.
The court in Farkas groped for examples of cases in which such
liability might arise. Suppose, it said,
without having revoked the trust, Farkas as trustee had given the
stock away without receiving any consideration therefor, had pledged
the stock improperly for his own personal debt and allowed it to be
lost by foreclosure or had exchanged the stock for another security or
other worthless property in such manner as to constitute gross impro-
priety and gross negligence.
79
The best way to see what is wrong with these examples is to imagine
each as a two-step transaction in which the settlor first redeemed the
shares and then used the proceeds to commit the act imagined. No
liability would result, because the trust explicitly declares that re-
7s Farkas, 5 Il. 2d at 422, 125 N.E.2d at 603.
76 Id. at 423, 125 N.E.2d at 604 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRuSTS § 56 comment f (i935)).
77 See id. at 432, 125 N.E.2d at 6o8.
78 See 3 A. ScOTT, supra note 66, § 219.4, at 1763 & n.3. In the Farkas case, the beneficiary
may not have known of the trusts. The settlor signed the declarations of trust and filed them
with the investment company. He placed the share certificates issued in his name as trustee in
his safe deposit box, where they were found after his death. See Farkas, 5 III. 2d at 420, 125
N.E.2d at 602.
79 Farkas, 5 Ill. 2d at 432, 125 N.E.2d at 608.
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demption is a permitted mode of revocation; and once the transferor
had revoked, he would, of course, be entirely free to be reckless with
his property. I suggest that if one of the transactions imagined by the
court were to occur, the court would treat the case as the analytical
equivalent of such a two-step transaction - revocation followed by
dealings free of trust.80 In other words, if a plaintiff brought such a
lawsuit - and of course, no one ever has - the estate of the transferor
would contend that the interest that the transferor retained under the
trust was so great that he owed no duty of care to those to whom he
might have left something.
The odor of legal fiction hangs heavily over the present-interest
test. We see courts straining to reach right results for wrong reasons
and insisting that will-like transfers possess gift-like incidents. Courts
have used such doctrinal ruses to validate not only the revocable inter
vivos trust, but the other will substitutes as well. Why is a transfer
by life insurance policy or by pension plan not void for violation of
the Wills Act? Because the beneficiary's interest is "vested" during
the transferor's lifetime. But how can it be vested when the transferor
may freely revoke the beneficiary's interest? Well, the power to revoke
simply makes the interest "vested subject to defeasance."'' s What is
the difference between the revocable and ambulatory interest created
by a will, and a vested but defeasible interest in life insurance or
pension proceeds.? None at all, except for the form of words. Simi-
larly, the joint bank account created merely as a probate avoidance
device has been treated as a true joint tenancy, despite the depositor's
power to exercise total lifetime dominion over the account. 82 Of the
pure will substitutes, only the transparently labelled P.O.D. account
has persistently failed the present-interest test8 3 and has had to depend
for the most part upon statutory validation.
80 The court in Farkas employed a similar two-step analysis to explain why a revocable inter
vivos trust should be valid even when the settIor retains extensive powers to direct and control
the trustee's administration and investment functions: "Actually, any . . . [such] powers could
readily be assumed by a settor with the reserved power of revocation through the simple
expedient of revoking the trust, and then, as absolute owner of the subject matter, doing with
the property as he chooses." Id. at 430, 125 N.E.2d at 607.
81
Some courts have been reluctant to state definitely that the interest of the beneficiary
is a mere expectancy where the insured has the power to change the designation and
have stated that the interest, in that case; is vested subject to defeasance by the act of
the insured. This is a mere nicety of language, comparable with using the right fork or
spoon at the table.
2 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 66, § gii, at 475 (footnote omitted); see also
Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Tex. Civ. App. i959) (adopting the vested-subject-to-
divestment formulation to analyze rights in a pension plan).
82 See,,e.g., Wimmer v. Staver, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (4935).
83 See, e.g., In re Estate of Atkinson, I75 N.E.2d 548 (Huron County, Ohio, P. Ct. i961).
Most courts applied the doctrine of federal supremacy to sustain P.O.D. designations in United




The lesson of this case law is that the courts sympathize with
people who want to avoid probate. As the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court said in 1944 in one of the most influential discussions
of the matter:
If an owner of property can find a means of disposing of it inter vivos
that will render a will unnecessary for the accomplishment of his
practical purposes, he has a right to employ it. The fact that the
motive of a transfer is to obtain the rpractical advantages of a will
without making one is immaterial.8 4
Granting that courts are disposed to favor the will substitutes, the
question remains: Why must they couch their support in fiction? Why
insist on finding a present interest that is lacking? Why deny the will-
like nature of the will substitutes?
B. Probate Monopoly or Transferor's Intent?
Underlying the case law is the premise that probate is the sole
means by which our legal system permits a transferor to pass his
property on death. Thus, in the Farkas case the court assumed that
Farkas' heirs, his probate takers, would be entitled to the mutual fund
shares unless the purported trusts were "present" transfers and hence
non-will-like. The assumption that will-like results may be achieved
only by instruments that are wills and that invoke the probate system
has distorted the law of will substitutes and turned it down the path
of fiction. I shall call this assumption the "probate monopoly theory."
The probate monopoly theory purports to derive from the funda-
mental texts of the law of gratuitous transfers - the Wills Act and
the Statute of Descent. Close inspection shows that neither compels
it. The typical Wills Act is silent on the qiestion of what transactions
it covers - that is, what transfers must take place by will. The
Uniform Probate Code, for example, defines "will" in a circular fash-
ion: "'Will' includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which
merely appoints an executor or revokes or revises another will."
8 5
Qualifications aside, this definition says that "'Will' includes . . . any
testamentary instrument" - in short, a will is a will. The Wills Act
fells us what formalities are necessary to effect a probate transfer, but
it does not purport to forbid or invalidate nonprobate transfers.
A stronger but still unsatisfying linguistic basis for the probate
monopoly theory can be found in the Statute of Descent, the law
governing succession to any property passing by intestacy. Again we
may take the UPC as a fairly typical example:. "Aiy part of the estate
of a decedent not effectively disposed of by his will passes to his heirs
84 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 471, 53 N.E.2d 113, 122 (1944) (citations
omitted).
S UPC § 1-201(48) (1982).
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as prescribed in the following sections of this Code."'8 6 This provision
throws us back on the meaning of the term "estate," which is defined
unhelpfully as "the property of the decedent. 87 But which property?
The probate monopoly theory would require us to read the definition
to include property that the decedent meant to pass by will substitute,
on the ground that his lifetime dominion made it still his property at
death. It is this interpretation that forces the courts to use the lifetime
transfer fiction to rescue the will substitutes. But this interpretation
is not compelled.
The better solution, which corresponds to modern practice, would
be to read "estate" as a residual entity containing only the property
not disposed of by will substitute. Such a reading would contradict
the probate monopoly theory and make unnecessary the pretense that
will substitutes are transfers completed in the lifetime of the transferor.
Of course, that interpretation requires a clear understanding of what
qualifies as a will substitute. Fortunately, the same~case law that has
been so disingenuous in finding fictional present interests has provided
a surprisingly candid and functional standard .for defining will substi-
tutes.
The courts have been uncomfortable with the present-interest test,
and they have attempted to provide a further justification for ex-
empting the will substitutes from the Wills Act - the concept of
"alternative formality." In truth, this notion cannot reconcile the.will
substitutes with the probate monopoly theory, but it can help us
identify the boundaries of the nonprobate system once we reject the
probate monopoly theory.
The court in Farkas invoked the alternative formality argument:
Another factor often considered in determining whether an inter vivos
trust is [void for violation of the Wills Act] is the formality of the
transaction. Historically, the purpose behind the enactment of the
statute on wills was the prevention of fraud. The requirement as to
witnesses was deemed necessary because a will is ordinarily an ex-
pression of the secret wish of the testator, signed out of the presence
of all concerned. The possibilities .of forgery and fraud are ever
present in such situations. Here, Farkas executed four separate ap-
plications for stock ... in which he directed that the stock be issued
in his name as trustee for Williams, and he executed four separate
declarations of trust in which he declared he was holding said stock
in trust for Williams. The stock certificates in question were issued
in his name as trustee for Williams. He thus manifested his intention
in a solemn and formal manner.88
86 Id. § 2-101.
87 Id. § 1-201(11).
88 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Il. 2d 417, 433, 125 N.E.2d 6oo, 6o8 (1955) (citations omitted);
see supra pp. 1126-28.
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Courts and scholars have made the same argument in support of the
other main will substitutes. The Totten trust, for example, "is voli-
tional, formal, and solidly backed by business practice."8 9 It involves
an "interview with the bank officer and the execution of [a] signature
card. These procedures would seeni to discourage hasty and impulsive
action and to reduce the danger of forgery, fraud and coercion to a
minimum." 90 In the field of life insurance, the courts treat the "al-
ternative formalities - those formalities required by the contract-
as a kind of quid pro quo for freedom from the wills statute and
probate procedure and costs." 91
The notion of alternative formality offers an important insight.
The will substitutes do exhibit formalities - written terms and sig-
nature - that parallel the requirements of the Wills Act. And in
some cases, the involvement of third parties such as bank officers and
insurance agents may serve some of the purposes of attestation. Mo-
tivated by considerations of efficiency and accuracy, the financial
intermediaries who operate the nonprobate system have developed
simplified formalities that largely serve the purposes of the Wills Act.
Indeed, the needs of business practice incline the nonprobate system
to a level of formality for the will substitutes that is well above the
minimum permitted in jurisdictions that allow holographic wills. Ho-
lographs get scratched on tractor fenders and bordello walls. 92 Totten
trusts and pension plans do not.
But what, precisely, is the significance of the insight that will
substitutes exhibit alternative formality? By emphasizing the func-
tional equivalence of will and will substitute, the notion of alternative
formality certainly points us away from the present-interest fiction.
Yet this emphasis only deepens our quandary if the probate monopoly
theory still holds - if, in other words, all transfer on death must be
by will or intestacy. If the Wills Act governs, the will substitutes are
void, because they do not comply with the Wills Act. The transferor
is not at liberty to invent alternative formalities for probate transfer,
no matter how well they might serve the purposes of the Wills Act.
The problem is not that the will substitutes are not formal enough,
but simply that their formalities are not those of the statute. Indeed,
we -can imagine types of noncompliance that exhibit a higher level of
formality than the Wills Act requires. Suppose, for instance, that a
testator attempted to make his will orally, on videotape, with credible
supernumerary witnesses present. No matter how earnest and con-
vincing his expression of testamentary intent might be, and no matter
89 Friedman, supra note 22, at 369.
90 Ritchie, What Is a Will?, 49 VA. L. REV. 759, 763 (1963).
91 Kimball, supra note 6, at 77.
92 For the tractor fender case, see 26 CAN. B. REV. 1242 (1948); for the case of the belly
dancer's bedroom wall, see J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 37, at 310.
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how superior videotape might be to writing, signature, and attestation
for achieving the various purposes of the Wills Act, the testator is not
at liberty to enact his own Wills Act. He must comply - at least
substantially 93 - with the governing Wills Act in order to effect a
probate transfer.
Alternative formality is not a test for compliance with the Wills
Act; it is a test for not having to comply with the Wills Act. Because
it sets limits on what constitutes a valid nonprobate transfer, it gives
us a basis other than the probafe rihonopoly theory for resisting claims
that casual documents are effective will substitute§. Alternative for-
mality is a test that tells us when a mode of transfer should be fairly
regarded as an effective will substitute operating outside the probate
system. Alternative formality thus defines the bounds of the nonpro-
bate system.
Modern practice supplies only one theory that can reconcile wills
and will substitutes in a workable and honest manner: the rule of
transferor's intent. The real state of the law is that the transferor
may choose to pass his property on death in either the probate or the
nonprobate system or in both. The transferor who takes no steps to
form or disclose his intent will be remitted to probate, the state system.
The transferor who elects to use any of the devices of the nonprobate
system will be protected in his decision, provided that the mode of
nonprobate transfer is sufficiently formal to meet the burden of proof
on the question of intent. to transfer. The alternative formalities of
the standard form instruments that serve as mass will substitutes
satisfy this requirement so easily that the issue of intent almost never
needs to be litigated. The transferor's-intent theory thus replaces the
probate monopoly theory. Transferors are free to opt out of probate
by selecting any of the well-demarcated nonprobate modes of trans-
fer.94
This intent theory supplies the implicit basis for the Uniform
Probate Code's article VI, which disavows the present-interest rubric
93 The view that small defects in formal compliance ought not to void a will is one that I
have developed in Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the. Way, 65 A.B.A.
J. 1192 (I979), and Langbein, supra note i8. See also R. WELLAIAN, L. WAGGONER & 0.
BROW ER, PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 154-57 (4th ed.
1983) (compendium of the latest developments in legislation and case law concerning the sub-
stantial compliance doctrine).
94 Lawrence Friedman made essentially this point in a somewhat different context when he
wrote:
In theory, property is legitimately transmitted to the next generation at death only
through the medium of a properly executed will or the laws of intestacy. But the "true"
rule, implicit in the behavior of courts and legislatures, is quite different. The legal
system actually finds acceptable other means of disposing of property at death provided
these means are (a) voluntarily adopted by the decedent, and (b) supported by the
regularized and formal course of practice of business or social institutions - banks, trust
companies, and insurance companies.
Friedman, sutra note 22, at 368.
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and validates the will substitutes wholesale. Article VI contains a
group of sections that deal with multiple-party bank accounts95 and
a general provision, section 6-201, that covers the rest of the will
substitutes. The sections governing bank will substitutes treat the
transferor as the exclusive owner of the account during his lifetime
but enforce the transfer to'the beneficiary on death.96 The official
comment explains that "a person who deposits funds in a multiple-
party account normally does not intend to make an irrevocable gift
of all or any part of the funds represented by the deposit."' 97 Never-
theless, the Code provides that "the account operates as a valid dis-
position at death rather than.as a present joint tenancy."98
The UPC's section 6-201, entitled "Provisions for Payment or
Transfer at Death," extends to most of the other mass will substitutes:
it brings within its coverage "an insurance policy, contract of employ-
ment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement, pension
plan, trust agreement, conveyance." 99 For good measure the section
lengthens its reach to whatever future products of financial interme-
diation may emerge: it includes "any other written instrument effective
as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust."'10 0 Each of these will sub-:
stitutes is declared "nontestamentary,"'' 1 meaning valid though inef-
fective as a probate transfer under the Wills Act.
The official comment to section 6-201 states flatly that "there
appear to be no policy reasons for continuing to treat these varied
[will substitutes] as testamentary."' 1 2 By suggesting that there is no
ground for interfering with the transferor's choice between probate
and nonprobate transfer, the draftsmen are in effect adopting what I
have called the transferor's-intent theory. The alternative formalities
that characterize the business practice of financial intermediation -
typically, filling in the bfanks on a standard f6rm contract and signing
it - are sufficient to evidence intent to transfer the assets in question.
The comment continues:
The revocable living trust and the multiple-party bank accounts, as
well as the experience with United States government bonds payable
on death to named beneficiaries, have demonstrated that the evils
9S UPC §§ 6-ioi to -1i 3 (1982). Section 6-Ioi(3).extends the scope of these provisions beyond
commercial banks to include credit unions and similar deposit takers.
96 See id. §§ 6-1o3 to -104.
97 Id. § 6-103 comment.
9s Id.
99 Id. § 6-2o(a).
100 Id. By requiring only a written instrument rather than the writing, signature, and
attestation necessary under the Wills Act, the draftsmen may be said to have -substituted the
level of formality characteristic of the Statute of Frauds for the higher level found in the Wills
Act.
101 UPC § 6-2oi(a) (1982).
102 Id. § 6-201 comment.
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envisioned if the statute of wills is not rigidly enforced simply do not
materialize. The fact that these provisions often are part of a business
transaction and in any event are evidenced by a writing tends to
eliminate the danger of "fraud."1
0 3
The UPC has not been adopted widely enough to solve by fiat the
problem of the juridical basis of the nonprobate system. 10 4 In juris-
dictions in which the UPC or similar legislation has not been enacted,
the rationale that the UPC supplies for its wholesale legitimation of
the will substitutes should guide courts to the same result as a matter
of construction of the Wills Act and the Statute of Descent. The UPC
disavows the present-interest fiction and recognizes that the will sub-
stitutes are transfers on death; it reiterates the declining importance
of the protective policy of the Wills Act; and it finds in the alternative
formality of the will substitutes further justification for placing non-
probate transfers beyond the reach of the Wills Act and the probate
system.' 05 This rationale, as we have seen, is implicit in the case law
that developed the alternative formality rubric.
The will substitutes are, of course, secure in American law re-
gardless of theory. Where legislatures have not intervened to immu-
nize the will substitutesr the courts have largely sustained the non-
probate modes of transfer through the lifetime transfer fiction. But
fiction has exacted its price. By practicing deception to validate the
will substitutes against the probate monopoly theory, the courts have
entangled themselves in a web of doctrinal inconsistency on interpre-
tive questions of recurring importance in the law of succession. Un-
derstanding the will-like character of the will substitutes is a prereq-
uisite to achiev'ing correct and uniform solutions to* functionally
identical problems.
IV. UNIFYING THE SUBSIDIARY LAW OF SUCCESSION
In most fields of law, rules can be divided into two sorts -
mandatory and subsidiary, jus strictum and jus dispositivum - ac-
cording to whether they override or yield to the contrary intentions
of the parties. In the law of wills, the formal requirements of the
Wills Act exemplify mandatory law: the testator is not free to invent
103 Id.
104 The opposition to the UPC has not, however, been directed at article VI, see, e.g.,
Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413, and many
jurisdictions have their own legislation protecting various will substitutes from the Wills Act.
For recent discussion of New York legislation, see Kane v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 84 A.D.2d
148, 151, 445 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (i98i).
105 For a good illustration of a court's relying upon the alternative formality rubric and
making ancillary use of the UPC in a non-UPC state, see Blanchette v. Blanchette, 362 Mass.
518, 524-26, 287 N.E.2d 459, 463-64 (1972); see also supra pp. izi4-iS (discussing case).
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his own formalities. But most rules of the law of wills are rules of
subsidiary law that apply only when a will is silent or unclear. Be-
cause of the long delay that often intervenes between the writing and
implementing of a will, the process of testation invites the creation of
subsidiary law. Circumstances often change across the decades in ways
that testators. do not address.
A simple example of such a "stale will" situation is that of the
testator who gets divorced after writing a will in favor of his spouse.
Good divorce lawyers take it as part of their job to see to it that
clients revise their wills, but not every client is represented by counsel,
much less good counsel, nor do clients inevitably act promptly in
accordance with counsel's advice. Suppose, therefore, that John and
Mary become divorced and that - months or years later - John dies
without having revised a will naming Mary as the primary beneficiary.
It can be argued that the will should be enforced as written - indeed,
that a testator's will should always be enforced unless and until he
revokes it. We are not accustomed to inquiring into the motivations
for devises; and in any case, not all divorces are bitter. John may
have wished Mary to take under the will notwithstanding the divorce.
If John had wanted to condition Mary's devise on the persistence of
their marriage, he could have said so in the will. '0 6
This position has, however, been decisively rejected in American
law. Either by statute or by case law, most of our jurisdictions have
reached the result that is codified in the Uniform Probate Code: the
divorce extinguishes Mary's interest.'0 7 If John wants Mary to take,
he must write a new. will or revise the existing will by codicil after
the divorce. The premise of the rule is that, because most testators
do not want to benefit ex-spouses, such a will no longer reflects the
intentions of the testator. Justice will more often be served if divorce
is treated as a species of partial revocation and litigation on the
question is foreclosed.
What of the will substitutes? Suppose that John had been equally
careless in leaving the beneficiary designation in his life insurance
policy unaltered. Chances are excellent that Mary would take, unless
the language of any marital property settlement between them could
be construed to reach the case. An Illinois court handled one of these
cases in the 197o's as follows:
Illinois follows the majority rule that a decree of divorce in no
way affects the rights of the divorced wife as a beneficiary in a
husband's life insurance policy... Surely, if the insured had wished
106 This view was taken in dissent by Judge Leventhal as recently as the mid-ig6o's. See
Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
107 See UPC § 2-508 (1982); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3D 1297 (1976). In some jurisdictions, the
presumption of intent to revoke the ex-spouse's devise is rebuttable, see id. at 1311-17, whereas
the presumption is irrebuttable under UPC-type statutes, see id. at 1303-o6.
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to substitute another person or his estate as beneficiary following the
divorce, he would have at least attempted to effect a change with the
insurer or included a provision in the property settlement agreement
indicating such intention.'
08
The Illinois case is typical in that the court felt itself under no obli-
gation to mention, much less to reconcile, the contrary rule and ra-
tionale of the law of wills. Said another court in one of these divorce/
life insurance cases: "It is settled in New Jersey that a named bene-
ficiary has a vested right to insurance proceeds, subject to divestment
according to the terms of the policy." '0 9 The doctrinal ruse that courts
use to escape the probate monopoly theory thus comes back to haunt
the law of will substitutes. Because the will substitutes are improperly
deemed lifetime transfers, principles of construction and presumptions
of transferors' intent that have been developed in the law of wills do
not apply.
Even when a court sees the tension between the rule for wills and
the contrary rule for will substitutes, the conventional mischaracteri-
zation of the will substitutes as lifetime transfers still complicates the
remedy. In Miller v. First National Bank & Trust Co.," 0 the trans-
feror set up an inter vivos trust for his wife and named the trust as
the beneficiary of his pour-over will. He divorced her and died with-
out amending either instrument. The estate plan would thus have
passed the probate assets to the trust, and from there to the ex-spouse.
The Oklahoma court applied the doctrine of incorporation by reference
in order to treat the trust as though it were part of the will. Accord-
ingly, the local divorce/will statute applied. This use of the doctrine
of incorporation was mistaken, of course, because there was no intent
to incorporate. The purpose of a pour-over is to avoid including the
trust in the probate estate." The court applied the ill-suited incor-
poration remedy because it saw no better way to extend the divorce/
will statute to the trust: under the lifetime-transfer theory of will
substitutes, the law of wills does not apply.
These cases would often solve themselves if the courts admitted
the will-like character of the will substitutes. Transferors use will
substitutes to avoid probate, not to avoid the subsidiary law of wills.
The subsidiary rules are the -product of centuries of legal experience
108 O'Toole v. Central Laborers' Pension & Welfare Funds, 12 Ill. App. 3d 995, 997-98, 299
N.E.2d 392, 394 (1973).
109 Gerhard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 N.J. Super. 414, 423, 258 A.2d 724, 729 (Ch. Div.
1969).
110 637 P.2d 75 (Okla. i98I).
11 As the dissenters in the Miller case pointed out, see 637 P.2d at 79-8o (Hargrave, J.,
dissenting), the Illinois court had refused remedy in a comparable case for fear that the will
substitutes would have to become probate wills: "It is quite clear that such documents are not
a part of the probate estate and are not a part of a decedent's will." In re Estate of Meskimen,
39 1ll. 2d 415, 417, 235 N.E.2d 61g, 621 (z968).
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in attempting to discern transferors' wishes and suppress litigation.
These rules should be treated as presumptively correct for will sub-
stitutes as well as for .wills. Once we understand that will substitutes
are nothing more than "nonprobate wills" and that no harm results
from admitting that truth, we have no basis for interpreting will
substitutes differently from' wills. "Both as a matter of legislative policy
and as a principle of judicial construction, we should aspire to uni-
formity in the subsidiary rules for probate and nonprobate transfers.
Even when the subsidiary law of wills has been reduced to statute, it
represents a determination about what testators ordinarily intend or
would have intended.
To be sure, the financial intermediaries who operate the nonpro-
bate system are careful enough in the wording of their transfer forms
that some of the major subsidiary rules would have little applicability
to the nonprobate system. These organizations have, for example,
been sensitive to the lapse problem. Beneficiary designation forms
usually encourage transferors to name contingent beneficiaries, and
the forms stipulate payment to the transferor's estate when no bene-
ficiary survives. Accordingly, there would be little occasion to apply
the antilapse statute1 12 to the will substitutes. Similarly, the asset-
specific character of the major will substitutes greatly lessens the
potential for ademption problems, 113 and the terms of most instru-
ments of transfer eliminate the issue by restricting the beneficiary's
interest to the account balance remaining on the. transferor's death.
On the other hand, we can point to a variety of situations in which
business practice does not correct for the want of uniform subsidiary
rules. The policy of the simultaneous death rule* for example, is to
implement the presumed intent of the transferor to avoid litigation
over the sequence of deaths and to prefer his own" cofitingent benefi-
ciary designations to those of his devisee or intestate taker. 114 Non-
probate transfers raise identical concerns and demand identical
rules. 115 Likewise, with respect to the status of adopted children in
matters of succession, there can be no reason other than oversight for
112 See UPC § 2-6o5 (1982).
113 See id. §§ 2-6o6 to -607, -6io.
114 See id. § 2-6O. An identical provision for intestate succession is § 2-104. For discussion
of the policy, see id. § 2-104 comment.
11s The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act applies to nonprobate transfers, but it leaves open
the possibility of litigation over the precise sequence of deaths, because it applies only when
"there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously."
UNIF. SIMuLTANEOUS DEATH ACT § I (1940); see, e.g., In re Estate of Bucci, 57 Misc. 2d
1001, 293 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sur. Ct. r968) (holding that, although husband and wife died in crash
of private airplane, evidence of carbon monoxide solely in wife's blood indicated that wife
inhaled fumes from the crash and hence survived husband for brief interval). The UPC
undertakes to suppress such litigation by requiring that takers survive the decedent by 120
hours, but the rule applies only to probate property. See UPC § 2-104 (1982) (intestacy); id.
§ 2-6or (testate succession).
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the failure of statutes like section 2-109 of the UPC 1 6 to reach non-
probate transfers. Indeed, Illinois now has a statute that addresses
this issue. 117 The law governing the apportionment of estate taxes
between probate and nonprobate assets has been moving strongly
toward equal treatment of the two. 118 In a quite recent development,
some courts have sought to extend the law governing will contracts
to inter vivos trusts. 119
The rule forbidding a testator to use his will to alter prior bene-
ficiary designations contained in will substitutes is also premised on
the spurious lifetime-transfer theory of will substitutes. For example,
in explaining its refusal to give effect to a testator's attempt to change
a life insurance beneficiary by will, a New Jersey court drew attention
to "the doctrine that a beneficiary has a vested right in the insurance
proceeds, subject to divestment."' 120 The California Supreme Court
pointed to the consequence of this reasoning in an opinion that is
still followed: "At death [the insured] no longer has a policy to
assign. . . He cannot then change the beneficiary [by will] because
the right of the named beneficiary has vested."' 121 Similar utterances
abound in cases in which transferors attempt to redirect pension,
insurance, bank-account, or trust assets by subsequent will.122 If the
fiction of lifetime transfer dould be candidly rejected, no other policy
of consequence would prevent the courts from honoring the transfer-
or's intent. The cases sometimes point to the need to protect financial
intermediaries from exposure to double payout, but that concern does
116 UPC § 2-109 (1982).
117 Act of Jan. I, 1976, § 2-4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 2-4 (1981). For an instance
in which a state supreme court refused over a strong dissent to apply the probate rule to a
trust, see Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974), which held that an adopted child was
not the settlor's issue. For further examples of such litigation decided both ways, see Annot.,
86 A.L.R.2D II5 (1962).
118 See In re Estate of Rosta, III fI1. App. 3d 786, 444 N.E.2d 704 (1982); Note, Equitable
Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax Liability: The Necessity of Clarifying Legislation, 1979
U. ILL. L.F. 703. The Revised Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act apportions federal and
state taxes among probate and nonprobate takers in proportion to their shares, unless the will
contraindicates. REvISED UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT § 2 (2964).
119 The first case was Reznik v. McKee, 2x6 Kan. 659, 534 P.2d 243 (1975). An Illinois
intermediate court followed the Kansas cases, see Northern Trust Co. v. Tarre, 83 Ill. App. 3d
684, 4o4 N.E.2d 882 (I98O), but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, mainly on constructional
grounds, Northern Trust Co. v. Tarre, 86 Ill. 2d 441, 427 N.E.2d 1217 (1g8i). The court
expressly postponed decision on the question "whether, under proper circumstances, the law
relating to joint and mutual wills is applicable to trusts." Id. at 449, 427 N.E.2d at 1220.
120 Strohsahl v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 71 N.J. Super. 300, 304,
176 A.2d 814, 816 (Ch. Div. 1962).
121 Cook v. Cook, I7 Cal. 2d 639, 646, iii P.2d 322, 327 (1942),followed in, e.g., Moss v.
Warren, 43 Cal. App. 3d 65I, 656, II7 Cal. Rptr. 796, 799 (1974).
122 See Annot., 25 A.L.R.4TH 1164 (2983) (fife insurance);- Annot., 8i A.L.R.3n 959 (1977)
(trust); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3D 487 (1972) (Totten trust); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3D 644 (1966) (public
pension rights). The rule criticized in text is codified in the UPC for joint ("multiple party")
accounts. UPC § 6-io4(e) (1982). The official comment mentions no rationale.
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not justify the rule. Stakeholder protection can easily be achieved by
less intrusive means. The rule should be that when a financial inter-
mediary pays the beneficiary named in the designation in its file, the
intermediary is protected as long as it lacked notice of a contrary
disposition by will. If a mistaken payment occurred, routine restitu-
tion law would make the recipient liable to disgorge it to the intended
beneficiary named in the subsequent will. 1
23
The lifetime-transfer theory of the will substitutes has certainly
not been the only cause of the doctrinal disharmony in our treatment
of probate and nonprobate transfers. The courts have had to work
with legislation that predates or is otherwise insensitive to the conse-
quences of the nonprobate revolution. The rules of subsidiary law
have too often been codified in statutes that speak only to probate
transfers. Even the enlightened Uniform Probate Code is, as its name
indicates, a probate code, not a succession code. It is a product of
its day - the ig6o's - When the reform of probate administration
was the draftsmen's overriding concern. Article VI of the UPC treats
the will substitutes 124 for relatively limited purposes - validating
them against the probate monopoly theory and sorting out the lifetime
rights of transferors in multiple-party accounts. The draftsmen did
not have it on their agefida to unify the subsidiary law of probate
and nonprobate transfers. Nevertheless, in the realm of mandatory
law, the UPC provides a dramatic example of the integration of
probate and nonprobate transfers. The UPC's forced-share scheme, 12
5
which is patterned on New York legislation, 126 extends the spouse's
elective share to virtually all the will substitutes, and it charges pro-
bate and nonprobate assets in proportion to their value. These mod-
ern forced-share schemes take their inspiration from the federal trans-
fer-tax rules, which obliterate the probate/nonprobate line for purposes
of determining what transfers should be subject to estate taxation.1
27
Having sketched a unified approach to questions of subsidiary law,
I must emphasize an intrinsic limit. When a rule of the law of wills
is premised on the requirements of Wills Act formality, the unified
approach should no longer pertain, because the Wills Act does not
govern the will substitutes. Perhaps the best example is the rule
forbidding reformation of wills on the ground of mistake - when,
for example, a typist drops or garbles a paragraph. The courts have
feared that remedying such mistakes would require that unattested
language be interpolated in violation of the requirements of the Wills
123 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 204 (1937).
124 See supra pp. 1133-34.
12S UPC § 2-202, -207 (1982). The UPC is equally comprehensive in treating the effect of
homicide by a beneficiary. Id. § 2-8o3. The UPC's pretermission rules in § 2-30I(a) and 2-
302(a)(3) also take some account of "transfer outside the will."
126 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney I98I & Supp. 1982).
127 I.R.C. 99 2o36-2038 (1982).
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Act. In the law of will substitutes, the courts have wisely permitted
such mistakes to be corrected when a high standard of proof can be
satisfied. 1
28
In European law, survivors settle decedents' estates without court
involvement unless there is contest or special difficulty. 129 Our non-
probate system has made it possible for Americans to achieve a similar
result, but at a price. Because American law has defined testation
and probate in terms of each other, we have had to sacrifice some of
the benefits of testation in order to escape probate. The doctrinal
disharmony in the subsidiary law of succession can be cured. Unifying
the rules of subsidiary law will not, however, restore the inherent
unity of the estate plan in a wealth transfer process in which testation
governs substantially all of a decedent's property.
In the wake of the nonprobate revolution, a decedent now effects
many wealth transfers at death, through instruments that have been
executed at different times and that may reflect different circumstances
of family and property. As these circumstances change, there is con-
siderable danger that the transferor may neglect to update one or more
components of an estate that involves numerous instruments and in-
stitutions of transfer. This fragmentation of decedents' estates requires
that lawyers practicing in the field of estate planning look beyond
probate property. In late-twentieth-century America, it is not enough
simply to write someone a will. The client now has many "nonprobate
wills" that the draftsman must consider and sometimes revise when
drawing up the "probate will."
V. CONCLUSION
The nonprobate revolution is a benign and irreversible develop-
ment. Free-market competitors have relegated probate to the periph-
ery of'the succession process. This Article has undertaken to explain
how the business practice of financial intermediaries has rendered
probate so often superfluous. But legal doctrine has not caught up
with this great transformation in the practice of succession. Courts
have dressed up the will substitutes as lifetime transfers in order to
avoid conflict with the probate monopoly theory of wealth transmis-
sion on death. This theory is fundamentally mistaken and should be
discarded. The law would function better if it admitted that will
128 See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of
Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 524-26 (1982). Waggoner and I have
criticized the rule forbidding reformation of mistaken wills as a misapplication of the Wills Act,
but that is quite beside the present point, which is that, even if the courts continue to apply
the rule to wills, there is no basis for extending it to non-Wills-Act transfers.
129 For an English-language discussion, see H. EMMERICH, ESTATE PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND IN EuRoPE I6-I8 (i95o).
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substitutes are simply "nonprobate wills." The inconsistent treatment
of identical interpretive questions raised by wills and will substitutes
is often linked to the mischaracterization of will substitutes as lifetime
transfers. The law of wills has reached sound solutions to these
interpretive questions, and I have urged that these solutions should
extend presumptively to the will-like transfers of the nonprobate sys-
tem. The result would be a unified American law of succession.
